Husserl’s Phenomenology

Explaining concepts of Intentionality and Phenomenology with reference to Dan Zahavi’s book

Introduction to Husserl

Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859–1938) was a Jewish-German philosopher and mathematician, best known for his status as the founder of Phenomenology. Two of his notable philosophical works are Logical Investigations (1900) and Ideas (1913). He (along with Sigmund Freud) was a student of Franz Brentano. As their teacher, he influenced Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. He is known for igniting a heated debate on the nature of consciousness and experience.

About Phenomenology

Phenomenology was a 20th-century movement aimed at describing experiences without the support of metaphysical or theoretical speculations/assumptions. In simpler words, it was an attempt to understand the nature of the world (as it appears to us) through the experiences of the self (without having any preconceived notions/assumptions about it). It was launched and propagated by philosophers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Ponty, who claimed that phenomenology was the foundation of philosophy.

Husserl defined it as follows:

Phenomenology is the science of the essence of consciousness centered on the defining trait of intentionality approached explicitly in the first person.

Against Science: Husserl believed that self-consciousness was the source of all knowledge and meaning. He pointed out that science, which was believed to be the foundation of all knowledge, does not give the ultimate rational explanation of the world, because it does not have an ultimate starting point. He was against the analytic philosophers’ attempts at turning philosophy into some kind of rigorous science (by making it objective).

This blog is an attempt at explaining the second part (Phenomenological Method and Intentionality of Consciousness) of Husserl’s Phenomenology by Dan Zahavi.

An Overview

In this part, Husserl attempts to answer the question of what it means to be conscious. His analysis is epistemological as he explores the cognitive dimension of consciousness. He aims to describe the world via human experiences (in the first person’s perspective only). Phenomenology is meant to be a true description of what appears, and consequently, give reasons to reject metaphysical speculations and scientific theories.

On Intentionality

For Husserl, intentionality is the attribute of object-directedness. In other words, it represents those experiences which consist of being conscious of something. In order to establish the legitimacy of Husserl’s understanding of the term, Zahavi explains and criticizes the other meanings that intentionality had come to be associated with.

The Rejection of Two Prevalent Views

As per the first view, consciousness can be compared to a container that, by itself, has no relation to the world, but if it is causally impacted by an external object, then a relation can be formed.

Zahavi criticizes this view of objectivist interpretation of intentionality as being wrong because it supposes intentionality to be a relation between two worldly objects. This would imply that there is no difference between being conscious of the heat of the sun and being heated by the sun.

The second view is subjectivist in nature. It claims that intentionality is a relation between consciousness and the (intramental) object it is conscious of.

Zahavi discards this view by pointing out that the intentional object is not act-immanent, as that would imply that it has the same mode of being as that of experience, and consequently demand for a rejection of the categorical distinction between act and object. This distinction cannot be rejected. The identity of the object does not depend on the identity of the act as it is possible for two different perceptions to perceive the same (identical) object. Hence, this view succumbs to the same fallacy as that witnessed in Prolegomena (related to Psychologism).

Mode of Givenness of Acts vs Mode of Givenness of Object

Husserl tries to lay great emphasis on the difference between the mode of givenness of our acts and that of our objects. It is imperative that, while perceiving an object, we differentiate between what appears (to us) and the (actual) absolute appearance, since the object never appears to us in its totality. Our perspective is limited, and no single perception is capable of capturing the whole of the object. Hence, ‘the object is never exhausted in a single givenness, but always transcends.’ Therefore, the identity of the object lies in connecting all of its different appearances.

But when it comes to consciousness, the case is different altogether. This can be explained with the help of an example given by Zahavi.

If in January 2000 I promise to bring a bottle of Beaujolais vintage 2002 as a present to my father’s 80th birthday in 2003, then this promise will be fulfilled if, in 2003, I give a real, physical, bottle of wine as a present. If the object of my promise, which when the promise was made didn’t exist, had been a mental object, I would not have been able to fulfill the promise in the said way. A promise that concerns a mental object cannot be fulfilled by presenting an extramental object; if I at first identify the object of my intention with an immanent mental object, it cannot later change and become identical with a transcendent, extramental, object.

If it is accepted that ‘unreal’ objects do not exist intramentally or extramentally, then hallucinations, fantasies, etc. would not be considered intentional. But Husserl states that these acts are intentional, notwithstanding their existence/non-existence in the world. This is why it is meaningless to assign these ‘unreal’ objects a kind of mental state to preserve the intentionality of the acts.

Against the Representative Theory of Perception

As per the representative theory of perception, each perception implies two distinct entities — the extramental object and the intramental representation. Husserl rejects this theory (and supports direct perceptual realism) by pointing out the error in the belief that the intentional relation between consciousness and the object can be clarified by claiming that the object exists outside the consciousness while the representation of it exists inside the consciousness.

The similarity between any two things in terms of their physical appearance does not imply that one is the image/picture of the other. This is explained with the help of the following example.

If one takes Dürer’s portrait of Emperor Maximilian, then this painting is first and foremost a physical object with a particular appearance. A blue frame, with a canvas, and some layers of paint. It is because of an interpretation that it first becomes a portrait of Maximilian, and it is only by means of this interpretation that the painting refers to and represents Maximilian.

Characteristics of Intentionality

The two points Husserl has made till now are — 1) Intentionality is not merely a feature of our consciousness. Instead, it also characterizes our predictions, fantasies, hallucinations and so on. 2) The intended object, in itself, is not a part of our contained consciousness.

He believes that the intentions aimed at ‘unreal’ objects and ordinary perceptions are equally characterized by their reference to or directedness towards transcendent objects. But, contrary to cases of ordinary perception, the referent has no intramental or extramental existence in cases like that of hallucinations (even though the hallucination might contain reference to a transcendent, extramental object).

Another noteworthy characteristic of intentionality is that it does not presuppose the existence of the two relata (and hence it cannot be called a relation). Intentionality is independent. The only thing required for its occurrence is ‘the existence of an experience with the appropriate internal structure of object-directedness.’

Husserl is strongly against intentional objects being taken as intramental content which, at best, function as mediators for accessing the real, transcendent objects. He emphasizes on the point that only the intentional object can be intended. Therefore, the attempt of differentiating between the intentional and real object becomes futile.

Phenomenology and Metaphysics

Husserl’s analysis of intentionality should not be misunderstood as supporting metaphysical realism. His claim that an object is ‘real’ has no metaphysical implication or an implication that the object exists mind-independently. Instead, it should be understood as a descriptive characterization (as the object is given a bodily presence intuitively).

Husserl’s metaphysical neutrality can be assessed by considering the following three views:

1. Rejection of metaphysics can be seen as a liberating move because metaphysical problems are pseudo-problems that have plagued philosophers for far too long without any resolution
2. Although phenomenology might lead to metaphysics, it does not, in itself, contain solutions to metaphysical problems. Phenomenology is a descriptive enterprise and not a universal answer source.
3. In contrast with the above two, the third view contends that metaphysical problems are, indeed, real problems, and solutions for the same can be found in phenomenology. Hence, Husserl’s self-imposed neutrality is criticized as being unnecessary.

Intentionality as a Constitutive Performance

Husserl believed that what makes an object, object, is our meaning-giving contribution. Also, he said that categorical objects appear to us only as what they are in our intentional acts. The metaphysical implications of his concept of constitution are, however, unclear because he did not formulate the status of the phenomenon, nor did he make clear the distinction between reality and appearance. Therefore, we do not know whether he was implying (by constitution) a production or an epistemic reproduction of an object.

Summing Up

Husserl’s transcendental philosophy is clearly not a course of metaphysical realism being turned into metaphysical idealism.

1. Husserl was metaphysically neutral in his understanding of phenomenology as a descriptive enterprise.
2. This stance has a number of shortcomings (for instance — lack of analysis of the status of phenomenon). Hence, its abandonment would not be problematic.
3. Even though his transcendental idealism is unlike traditional idealism, it has (later) been interpreted as an effort at putting an end to both metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism.