Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
An overview of what Lakatos thought of Popper’s and Kuhn’s work, in light of his own MSRP.
Introduction to Imre Lakatos
Born in Hungary in 1922, Imre Lakatos was an influential philosopher of science and mathematics. He is considered to be Karl Popper’s mentee and also his greatest critic. He is best known for his work “Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” or MSRP.
Lakatos on Kuhn and Popper
On Popper
Popper claimed to have solved the Problem of Demarcation by introducing the criterion of falsifiability that distinguishes science from pseudo-science. As per Popper and his principle of falsifiability, we discard a system when we find anomalies in it.
Popper claimed his account of science and Falsificationism to be based on rationality (as opposed to Kuhn’s lack of rationality). Lakatos is believed to have taken Popper’s side in response to Kuhn.
Lakatos is responsible for extending Popper’s idea about scientific theories not being capable of being proven right. He also broadened Popper’s conception of science as being more about ‘conjectures and refutations’ than about ‘foundational truths’, and that scientific progress involves constant and continued proposal of improved theories replacing the ones before them.
Popper and Lakatos rejected the following:
a) the Aristotelian proposition that attempted to characterize science as having apodictic (undeniable/deductive) certainty
b) the Newtonian proposition of accepting the inductive method as the scientific method
On Kuhn
In disagreement with Popper, Kuhn believed that finding a few anomalies in a system should not necessarily mean that it needs to be discarded, or else science would never be able to make any progress.
Kuhn criticizes Popper by pointing out that practically, in science, a theory is not refuted unless it is replaced by a new (and better) one. However, this process of theory change falls within the ‘social psychology’ of science.
While Lakatos recognized the problem with Popper’s Falsificationism that Kuhn pointed out, he calls Kuhn’s influence as ‘disruptive of reason’ and hence a ‘danger’ to society, as the process of scientific change presented by him seemed fundamentally irrational (as mob psychology).
Lakatos believed that Kuhn had damaged the image of science with his ‘mob psychology’ idea of the scientific community dismissing systems. He aimed to restore rationality to it. While he accepted the role of the scientific community as being vital in judging the strength of a scientific system, he pointed out how multiple opinions prevail in the same community, and how there is no single scientific community which can presume such an authority.
As presented by Lakatos (and in contrast to Kuhn), the concept of scientific shifts and revolutions has little to do with communal consonance, and is instead, more rational in nature. Even though he claimed Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts is interesting, he takes rational and empirical factors into consideration when transitioning from one scientific theory to another.
So, while Lakatos could see some merit in Kuhn’s arguments, his project was primarily to save science and aid its recovery from the damage that Kuhn had caused to it by compromising its rationality.
On Scientific Research Programmes
A research program can be defined as a sequences of theories within a domain of scientific inquiry. According to Lakatos, the ‘basic unit’ of science is not a scientific theory. Instead, it is the more complex Scientific Research Program (SRP). While it is possible for the SRP to be compared with Kuhn’s Paradigm system, there is a key difference between them. A scientific field can accommodate more than one SRP at any time. A ‘theory’ is a succession of different theories and techniques that share a particular set of fundamental ideas (which are considered ‘hardcore’). Scientists who work within a particular research program protect the ‘hardcore’ principles from being falsified with the help of a ‘protective belt’ consisting of supporting theories. So, ‘hardcore’ is a set of basic ideas that are essential for any scientific theory that is contained in the program. ‘Protective belts’ are a less fundamental set of ideas that apply both to the hardcore and to the actual phenomenon.
To better understand this, here’s an example. Take the Newtonian Research Program, which was popular in the 18th century. At its hardcore, it contains Newton’s three laws of motion and his gravitational law. The protective belt of this SRP would contain detailed ideas about matter, motion, or the universe (that would be subject to change with time). As per Lakatos, any and every SRP evolves over time. Its growth and sustainability are a result of the scientists’ beliefs (which are ‘heuristics’). These heuristics may either be positive (refutable) or negative (irrefutable) and act as a guide in telling us which research paths need to be avoided.
On Negative and Positive Heuristics
Negative Heuristics, as per Lakatos, make up the hardcore, and their revision is not permitted within the context of the given program. Because of this absolute level of protection that surrounds the negative heuristics, the hardcore is, at times, compared to the (dogmatic practice of) ‘normal science’. Directing the modus tollens at the hardcore is forbidden.
Positive Heuristics is meant to save the scientist from the confusion that anomalies have the potential to create. This is because positive heuristics are flexible whereas negative heuristics aren’t.
Taking the example of the Newtonian program, the negative heuristics, being absolute, protected the hardcore, whereas when anomalies were encountered in the protective belt, small changes were made to accommodate them. In this sense, Lakatos was with Kuhn (and against Popper) for not discarding a complete scientific system on encountering a few anomalies.
Progressive and Degenerating SRP
Problemshift refers to the movement from one theory to the next within the same research program. A SRP is considered to be successful if it leads to a progressive problemshift, and unsuccessful if it leads to a negative one.
There are two ways in which a problemshift may be considered progressive.
a) Theoretically, when they move towards new theories that enable the prediction of more that was allowed by the preceding one
b) Empirically, when, actual observation is capable of confirming the new predictions
As per Lakatos, for a research program (as a whole) to be considered progressive, it needs to be theoretically progressive, and should be, at least occasionally, empirically progressive. This means that in a progressive SRP, a problemshift would allow us to predict more with each new theory. In contrast to this, a SRP is considered to be degenerating when the above characteristics are missing. This would be an indication for the scientists to abandon that particular SRP.
