On The Problem of Religious Language
How can language be used meaningfully while discussing religious concepts? Here’s what Kei Nielsen had to say.
Overview
In this article, Nielsen talks about the problem of religious language. The problem can be understood through the question — How can we talk meaningfully about god or other religious concepts when a language is derived from our experience of the physical world and god is thought to be beyond the physical world?
Religious language, Nelson defines, is the language that is used to express religious concepts like god, soul, salvation and so on. He believes religious language to be different from ordinary language as it is, at times, evocative, metaphorical and poetic.
Nielson explorers different approaches to comprehending the problem of religious language. The first approach, Verificationism, places emphasis on the need for objective verification or falsification of religious claims. The second approach, Metaphysical Realism, puts forward the view that religious language refers to objective realities that are beyond human experience.
He also discusses in length the Wittgensteinian and the neo-pragmatic approaches to religious discourse as per which factors like context, practical goals, and social and historical practices are of utmost importance in constructing our conception of religious language.
Verificationism
As per the view of Verificationism, only those statements count as being meaningful which can be verified either empirically or logically. In other words, meaningful statements can be confirmed through empirical observation or through logical deduction. This way of thinking was popular in the early 20th century, especially amongst the members of the Vienna Circle (analytic philosophers).
This view held that language should be understood on the basis of its verifiability. But when we apply it to religious language, problems arise. Statements like ‘God exists’ or ‘God is so-and-so’ are neither directly verifiable through the means of empirical observation nor through the tool of logical deduction. Thus, if the view of Verificationism is to be adopted, such statements would be rendered meaningless.
But this position is not without drawbacks. In upholding the narrow and scientistic view of reality and language, it overlooks the complexity and richness of human experience. It also assumes that for statements to be meaningful, they must be empirically verifiable. It leaves no space for considering the possibility of the existence of non-verifiable meaningful statements.
For example, statements like ‘God is like a loving parent’, which work to express the feeling/experience of its speaker, convey a meaningful aspect of their religious experience, even if they cannot be empirically verified.
In response to the drawbacks pointed out by him regarding the position of Verificationism as stated above, Nielsen puts forward a more expansive and analogical conception of religious language. As per this view, religious language is derived from our experience of the physical reality, but we extend it to discuss religious matters in an imperfect and restricted manner. Thus, this alternative approach would allow us to view religious language as being meaningful even if it is not empirically or logically verifiable.
Metaphysical Realism
As per the position of metaphysical realism, reality exists independently of human thought or language. In simpler words, the existence of the real world is not dependent on whether or not we talk or think about it. This view is in direct opposition to metaphysical idealism, as per which the world is a product of human thought or language.
Problems arise when this view is applied to religious language, as the latter usually involves discussing concepts (like soul or god) which lie beyond direct observation or experience. This would suggest that religious entities or concepts exist independently of human language, meaning that our language about them must either be true or false, without taking into consideration what our beliefs or intentions are.
Nielsen points out various flaws in such a position. The claim that there exists an objective and fixed reality independent of human thought or language is a controversial one. This position also assumes for religious language to be either true or false without considering the context or aim of the speaker. Additionally, it ignores the analogical and metaphorical use of language.
Continuing his support for an analogical (rather than literal) conception of language, Nielsen adds that it might help in overcoming the above-mentioned problems as it would allow for religious language to be meaningful without needing a literal interpretation, or a fixed or objective reality.
When someone says– “God is good,” they are using language analogically as their idea of goodness is derived from their experience of moral goodness in the physical world. At the same time, we realize that our idea of ‘good’ is imperfect and does not fully capture the nature of God. This allows for religious language to be meaningful even though it does point to objective metaphysical realities like scientific language does.
Wittgensteinian Approach
The Wittgensteinian turn in philosophical thinking concerning religious language discourse came about in the mid-20th century. It was inspired by the ideas of the notable Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. As per Wittgenstein, language is not an objective and fixed system of meaning. Instead, it is a socio-cultural practice molded by the context and norms of its use. Thus, it should not be subject to objective verification or falsification. Two kinds of Wittgensteinian approaches will be discussed below:
First Kind
The idea of family resemblances is central to this approach. This suggests that religious concepts like God or sin, instead of having universal and fixed definitions, have a family of related meaning formulated by the usage of language within that particular religious community. For example, the concept of God/soul/salvation and so on might have varying meanings for different religious communities, and these meanings are subject to change and evolve with time.
Second Kind
This approach emphasizes upon the role of religious practices and rituals in shaping religious language and beliefs. It encourages viewing religious language as a way of participating in and expressing religious practices, instead of being a tool for describing objective facts about the world. For example, clear propositional content might be lacking in the language used during religious rituals, but it still may retain significant meaningfulness for the participants of the ritual.
Neo-Pragmatist Turn
Philosophers like William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam influenced the rise of the neo-pragmatist turn on religious discourse, which called for a more pragmatic understanding of religious language. This approach aimed to highlight the contextual and practical nature of language use, and stressed upon the importance of historical and social context in shaping our understanding of religious language.
Religious language should be viewed as a practical tool for realizing certain ends and making sense of our experiences, rather than as an objective and fixed system of meaning. Since its practical use would be a result of social and historical context, it should not be subject to objective verification and falsification. An emphasis is placed on the practical and functional role of language.
For example, this approach can be observed in the work of Richard Rorty, who claimed that our values and beliefs are not derived from an objective or external reality, but on our cultural and social conventions. Thus, religious language is not concerned with expressing or representing an external reality, but the shared values and beliefs with context to a particular society.
Nielsen pointed out certain drawbacks that come with this position as well. He recognized the possibility of tensions and conflicts arising between the various possible practical functions of religious language, and the difficulty in selecting a criteria for accessing the fitness of religious language in fulfilling its practical functions.
Conclusion
The problem of religious language is a complex and multifaceted one. The approaches discussed by Nielsen give us different perspectives on the nature of religious language and what their role is in our lives. Some hold that religious language needs to be subject to objective verification, while others believe that its use and meaning is construed by our historical and social context.
Instead of trying to resolve the problem of religious language through a single overarching theory, Nielsen proposes that we approach it with an open mind while considering different perspectives and practicing critical reflection. Thus, instead of endorsing a single theory as a complete solution to the problem of religious language, he endorses the quest for continued exploration and discussion through a careful and critical analysis and reflection of the role of religious language in our lives.
