Russell on Knowledge by Description and Acquaintance
An overview of the fifth chapter of Russell’s book ‘The Problems of Philosophy’
Introduction to Russell
Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872–1970) was a British philosopher, social critic, writer, and political activist. His most significant contributions have been to the fields of mathematical logic and analytic philosophy. He is known for leading the British revolt against Idealism in the early 20th century. Considered to be one of the founders of analytic philosophy, Russell was also the teacher of the influential philosopher Wittgenstein. His book The Problems of Philosophy is one of the most influential philosophical works.
Overview of The Problems of Philosophy
Meant to be an introductory book to philosophy, Russell writes about what can be known, and the role of philosophy in identifying and classifying knowledge (as opposed to uncertainty). In the first few chapters, the field of epistemology and its chief questions are explored and analyzed. Then, the philosophical contributions of influential western philosophers are discussed. Russell introduces the concepts of rationalism, empiricism, and idealism. In doing so, he points out the salient features of each school of thought. As a whole, this book is an argument for the immense value that philosophy, as an academic discipline and in general, has to the individual and to society.
Detailed Summary of Chapter 5
Russell claims that there are two kinds of knowledge — knowledge of truths and knowledge of things. For this chapter, Russell says that we are only concerned with the latter. Knowledge of things can be divided into the following two — knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.
Knowledge by acquaintance is obtained directly by experience and without reference to any truths. It is hence the simplest kind of knowledge there is. He elucidates this with an example of a table. An experience of the color (‘brownness’) of the table is (an experience of) knowledge by acquaintance. Nothing more can be added to it. This experience of the table’s color is immediate and complete.
Russell points out that we do not know the table itself by the means of acquaintance. We can create a description of it using the set of sensations that we associate with it. Then, it can be said that our knowledge of the table is knowledge by description.
Calling acquaintance the foundation of both, knowledge of truth as well as of things, Russell lists the following things that are capable of being known through it — memory, direct sensation, introspection, self (to an extent), and general ideas.
Then he goes on to differentiate between ambiguous (a so-and-so) and definite (the so-and-so) descriptions. Believing ambiguous descriptions to be problematic, he advises that they should be avoided and that they are not necessary for obtaining a definition of knowledge by description. Russell contends that it is knowledge of definite descriptions that he will focus on. A definite description is composed of a set of properties that refer to a particular object. Some part of this description must be known to us by acquaintance unless the existence of the object is derived from a logical analysis of the description (for example, the tallest human alive). Russell explains how, in the analysis of propositions gathered from knowledge of description, we come to find that its (each proposition’s) constituents are those with which we have acquaintance. Because if it were not so, then we would have been unable to formulate any judgments about them. Hence, the meaning of the words in a proposition is derived from acquaintance.
The Distinction in Detail
About Knowledge by Acquaintance
“We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths…..I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S.” — Russell
It can be said that we have knowledge of a thing by acquaintance when we are directly aware of that thing, without having to employ the process of inference. For example, through our sense-data, we can immediately perceive that the color of the wall in front of us is, say, purple. An important point that Russell makes here is that there is no logical dependence on the knowledge of truth for us to be acquainted with something. As per the given example, we are immediately aware of the color of the wall “perfectly and completely when (we) see it”, even if we do not know any ‘truth’ about the color.
Therefore, acquaintance can be understood to be a relation of direct awareness in which something is presented to the subject. As a form of awareness, it is both non-judgmental and non-conceptual. Acquaintance with a thing does not involve the formation of a judgment or conceptual representation of it. In addition, a relata (related item/thing) is essential for there to be an acquaintance, since acquaintance is, by nature, the acquaintance of genuine objects (that exist).
About Knowledge by Description
To understand this, we will refer to the same example. When we claim to have knowledge of the wall itself (which is a physical object), another kind of knowledge is involved here. A way of describing the physical object using sense-data would take this form as a sentence — ‘the physical object which causes such-and-such sense data’. Hence, knowledge by description depends on the sense data which we have acquired, as well as on truths, like knowing what sense data is caused by a particular physical object.
Therefore, we can infer knowledge about the actual world through knowledge by description by considering the things which we know through direct acquaintance via our subjective sense data.
Knowledge by Acquaintance as Bedrock
“Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.” — Russell
Russell emphasizes the point that knowledge by acquaintance is the basic building block of all kinds of knowledge. He also makes it clear that sense-data is not the only thing involved in the acquaintance of knowledge. There is also acquaintance by memory, as we can access (in the present) and be aware of things we perceived in the past. Then there is the acquaintance by introspection, in which we are aware of our awareness of a thing. This can also be understood as self-consciousness, though Russell refrained from delving into it further (by calling it an unclear dimension of acquaintance).
“We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense — thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things.” — Russell
Russell adds that we can know through acquaintance not only particular, concrete, and existing things, but also abstract and general universal ideas.
On the Working of Knowledge by Description
Russell states that the two most evident things that we know through description are physical objects and others’ minds. We can be said to possess knowledge by description when we can say that there exists an object that matches a definite description, even though we have not been acquainted with this object. Russell emphasizes the importance of grasping this concept as our language use is heavily dependent on it. For example, when we use proper names or common words, we depend on their implicit meaning in descriptive knowledge. It is through descriptions or propositions only that we are able to explicitly express what the thought of a proper name denotes.
The Bismarck Example
Russell explains the above concepts with the help of his cogent Bismarck example. In the first instance, he is asking us to imagine that there is a proposition/statement about Bismarck. If Bismarck himself is the speaker (who has direct acquaintance with himself), then it is possible that he is making a self-referential judgment in which his name appears as a constituent. This would be knowledge by acquaintance.
“(In this case)….proper name has the direct use which it always wishes to have, as simply standing for a certain object, and not for a description of the object." — Russell
But, on the other hand, if it is a friend of Bismarck who is the speaker, then they would be known as having knowledge by description. This person is acquainted with sense-data which they relate to Bismarck’s body. The vital description refers to the connection of the mind and body through sense data. The speaker keeps in mind that the sense-data related to Bismarck is subject to change and hence is aware of certain/particular valid descriptions. Further, Russell talks about people like him or the reader making a statement about Bismarck based on historical knowledge, by saying, for example, that Bismarck was the “first Chancellor of the German Empire.” In order for this description to be valid/meaningful, a relation must be established between the particular with which we have direct acquaintance and the particular with which we intend to have indirect acquaintance.
On Distinguishing Particulars from Universals
Here, Russel gives the example of “the most long-lived of men”. This is a description consisting of universals. We know that it must apply to a particular human, but we have no means of inferring a judgment about them.
Russell states, “all knowledge of truths, as we shall show, demands acquaintance with things which are of an essentially different character from sense-data, the things which are sometimes called ‘abstract ideas’, but which we shall call ‘universals’."
On Description and Acquaintance
In itself, a description consisting of universals gives us no knowledge by acquaintance to point to or to infer a particular human who has lived the longest. Going back to the Bismarck example, “The first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomat,” as a statement consists of a particular description and makes a judgment that we can only make sense of in relation to our acquaintance with it (say, by reading or hearing about it).
In our language, statements about things known by description work as statements about the actual thing described (as they are used to refer to that particular thing). The aim that we have is to establish statements with direct authority. But, there is a varying degree of acquaintance (from Bismarck making a statement about himself, from his friends doing it, from the reader doing it, to the ‘longest-lived of men’, with acquaintance decreasing in the same order for relevant particulars). In the case of the Bismarck propositions, a number of propositions can be made pertaining to a particular object which brings us closer to direct acquaintance, but in the case of the ‘longest-lived of men’, only propositions that are logically deducible from the universals can be made.
Julius Caesar Example
Russell points out the importance of indirect knowledge in giving meaning to common, everyday words. Here, he gives an example of a statement referring to Julius Caesar being made. Even though as a speaker, one does not have direct acquaintance with Caesar, they can still make descriptions of him being “the founder of the Roman Empire” or “the man who was assassinated on the Ides of March”. So, it is through knowledge by description that we are able to gain knowledge about things that we have not directly experienced/acquainted ourselves with.
Endnote
Through the above explanation, it is now understood that knowledge obtained by description is reducible to knowledge by acquaintance. This is what Russell calls his fundamental principle in the study of propositions consisting of descriptions. He points out that knowledge by description allows us to gain knowledge beyond our private experiences and allows us to use a public language.
So, while we can be certain of the knowledge we gain through an acquaintance, we should also acknowledge that such a form of knowledge is private in nature. It is knowledge from descriptions that permits us to surpass the boundary of private experiences and gather knowledge of the things that we ourselves have not experienced.
