Sartre’s Ontological Analysis of Being and Concept of The Look

An analysis of Being, the Look, and how it affects us, as given in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness

Introduction to Sartre

An influential 20th century French philosopher, novelist and playwright, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) is best known as an exponent of Existentialism. Nausea (1978), Being and Nothingness (1943) and Existentialism and Humanism (1946) are his most notable works.

Overview of Being and Nothingness

The purpose of this text is to develop a philosophical account in favor of existentialism. In doing so, Sartre explores topics like consciousness, social philosophy, self-deception, perception, nothingness, psychoanalysis and free-will.

Overview of The Look

In this section, Sartre explores the problem of the other, i.e., how does one apprehend the other as a subject? Sartre claims that it is through the Look that one obtains thematic awareness of the body, leading to the formation of a sense of self-consciousness in the one who is being looked at. He also talks about the consequences of being looked at, and how it can lead to emotions like pride and shame.

Ontological Structure

Sartre considered an encounter with the other as an ontological event through which self-consciousness is awakened. Influenced by Heidegger and Husserl, he talks about the role of being and its existence. He claims that Being-in-itself, Being-for-itself, and Being-for-others are the three modes of existence. The two principle characteristics that form the basis of his ontology are en-soi (in-itself) and pour-soi (for-itself).

The en-soi, or the in-itself is self-identical. This means that it is founded upon itself and is independent of everything else. It is not created and does not require reason. Such a being is revealed to us by the likes of nausea and boredom. Also, it characterizes the existence of objects in the world.

On the other hand, the pour-soi, or the for-itself is not self-identical. It is dynamic and active, and can be understood as being the negation of en-soi. Sartre believes the pour-soi to be consciousness. The for-itself has a tendency of moving towards future possibilities, and this consciousness is what creates a nothingness in the core of the in-itself. Therefore, the perception of the in-itself is marked by facticity whereas in the case of for-itself, it is marked by the transcendence of the aforementioned facticity.

The intersubjective nature of human existence is captured by Being-for-others. To elucidate — I am an object for the other in the same way the other is an object for me. Sartre points out a tragedy here — that one can see everyone but oneself.

Body’s Three Dimensions

Sartre emphasizes on the point that being-for-itself is that notion of embodiment and intentional consciousness that is manifested through the body. The body, being the ground for subjectivity, is what makes up the ‘totality of meaningful relations to the world’.

Sartre elaborates upon the three ontological dimensions of the body, which are — the body as being-for-itself, the body for-others, and myself as a body known by the Other.

The First Dimension — Body as being-for-itself

Here, Sartre stresses on the claim that the body, as lived, is not capable of being regarded as in-itself. Unlike tables and chairs, a body is not regarded as an object of perception when it is engaged intentionally with the environment around it.

The Second Dimension — Body for-others

In this dimension, the body is known and utilized by the others. The person being utilized gathers the realization that they are exist as an object for the others. The knowledge that one might have about oneself through lived experiences is different from the knowledge that the others might have of that person. This aids in the grasping of a abstract, conceptual awareness of one’s body as a knowing organism possessing objective features characteristics and existing amidst other beings.

The Third Dimension — Body as known by the Other

This is also referred to as the ‘seen’ body. It is a result of an interaction. To elucidate, one does not experience’s one’s body as one’s own, but instead perceives it through the others’ experience of it. Therefore, the ‘seen’ body is one’s perception of one’s own body not from a lived-through experience, but from a distanced perspective. It is through this that one comes to be reflectively self-aware.

“I experience and am aware of how (I think) the other sees me.” — Sartre

The Look

To answer the question — “How do we know that the Other exists?”, Sartre points to the feelings of shame, terror, pride and the like, that are a consequence of the Look. It is by being conscious and looking at others that we are able to judge.

Sartre believed the act of being seen by others (as an object) to be very significant. He claimed that this is what enables one to see oneself and create consciousness, allowing for reflective self-awareness and self-judgement.

“I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being.” — Sartre

Sartre states that when one is looked at by the Other, one is reduced to an object. It is important to point out here that Sartre was inspired by Hegel’s Master-Slave Dialectic. This is evident the description of the encounter between consciousness as a struggle for subjectivity and an unending conflict between the Other and I as given by Sartre (influenced by the constitution of subjectivity in mutual recognition and negation).

Voyeur Analogy

Sartre explains the significance of the Look with this popular example. Suppose one is looking through a peephole (‘inspired by jealousy or curiosity’). This person is not yet conscious of their action and its unethical nature. But when they become aware of another person perceiving them doing such an act, they are overcome with a feeling of shame. This is how the presence of the Other disrupts one’s world (one loses one’s freedom), by inducing reflecting self-consciousness in them.

“The Other’s look makes me be beyond my being in this world and puts me in the midst of the world which is at once this world and beyond this world.”

“(Shame) is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object.”

“I grasp the Other’s look at the very center of my solidification and alienation of my own possibilities...The Other as a look is my transcendence transcended.”

— Sartre in Being and Nothingness

Analysis and Conclusion

Sartre’s account of the Look is a multi-faceted account of objectification, visibility, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. It emphasizes on the others’ power to objectify the (human) object of perception.

Even though every instance of being looked at (objectification) does not lead to feelings like that of shame (alienation), Sartre’s account of the Look is essential to understand the development of self-awareness, and how the existence of the others (in a society, for example) has a role to play in that.

Therefore, the Look can be understood as an important and insightful phenomenological and ontological analysis of existence.