Thanks for your comment, Manarch. Apologies for the delay in replying.

Glad that you liked the analogy.

I don't think Popper's principle of falsifiability is the foundation of the authority of the scientific method. It is deduction (as made popular by Aristotle), if I'm not wrong. It is the dogmatism that comes with the foundationalism of deduction that Popper had an issue with, I believe.

From the limited knowledge of Popper I have, I think you might be right in thinking that it could be a means of progressing towards a dialectic not delimited by empiricism. That is what 'conjectures' and 'hypotheses' are there for, in Popper's philosophy - to show that science does not start in experience.

Hm, it is similar to Descartes' method of doubt. He too, i think, subjected to falsification every belief he had. But at the end, he permitted a few 'clear and distinct' truths, which i don't think Popper would have admitted.

Kind regards :))