The Dilemma of Defining ‘Knowledge’ — The Problem of Criterion
What are the problems one faces while attempting to define knowledge? What are the two responses to it?
The Problem of Criterion
Epistemologists have struggled to develop an unproblematic account of knowledge. How can we define knowledge? An intuitive answer is to take into consideration the cases in which one has knowledge and pick out what is common in all of them. But here’s the problem — if you are not sure about the defining characteristics/criteria for knowledge, how can you accurately pick out cases of knowledge in the first place?
This perplexing task of attempting to define knowledge is called the problem of criterion. It can be summarized in the following two claims:
- instances of knowledge can only be identified if the criteria for knowledge is already known
- criteria for knowledge can only be known if the instances of knowledge can be identified
This problem poses a dilemma — one must either assume what the criteria for knowledge is, or one must assume what instances of knowledge are. And assumptions (as they lack a solid foundation in reasoning) are not favored by epistemologists.
It would be helpful to read the blog What counts as ‘knowledge’? for you to grasp this concept better.
Methodism and Particularism
Influential American epistemologist Roderick Chisholm made a strong case in support of epistemic internalism and a form of classical foundationalism. In his notable work, The Foundations of Knowing, he said:
“We start with particular cases of knowledge and then from those we generalize and formulate criteria [which tell] us what it is for a belief to be epistemologically respectable.”
Chisholm was in favor of the stance of Particularism, instead of Methodism. He describes Methodism as being the historically favored stance, in which philosophers begin with the assumption of being able to define the criteria for knowledge through philosophical reflection alone, and then use this criteria to determine whether they have knowledge in particular cases or not. Rene Descartes was a Methodist philosopher. On the other hand, Particularism advocates for the assumption that it is possible to first identify particular instances of knowledge and then, using these instances, figure out what the criteria for knowledge are.
Since both of these positions are gripping one or the other horn of the problem of criterion, they have their own share of convincing criticisms against them.
When it comes to Methodism, there is one advantage — it is open to the problem of skepticism. The question whether there is even a determinable criteria for knowledge is up for discussion. But the biggest problem it faces is the mystery of determining a criteria for knowledge without drawing from cases of knowledge.
Conclusion
It is because of this mystery, and the seemingly unavoidable need for making an assumption to escape the problem of criterion that philosophers, since Chisholm, have tended to side with the position of Particularism. This is because making the assumption that one can identify cases of knowledge without an a-priori awareness of the criteria of knowledge seems less bizarre than the assumption that one can determine the criteria for knowledge without any prior reference to cases of knowledge. Skeptics are, naturally, against such a choice because they believe that the claim that there is knowledge, in the first place, has just been assumed (and not shown) by the Particularists.
