The Epistemological Side of Plato’s Republic

A detailed discussion of the the inception of epistemology in Plato, with a focus on his concept of ‘order’, ‘good’ and ‘episteme’

Image by günter from Pixabay

The intent of my study of Plato is to see the inception of epistemology (and metaphysics) in his thought. Traditionally, the Republic was understood as an epistemological text, before its modern political interpretation. (Interestingly, until the 16th century, it was not considered to be a main text by Plato. Timaeus was taken to be his most important text.)

Role of Good in Intelligibility and Order

The givenness of truth is the primary concern of philosophy and philosophers. We do not create the eidos (essence), it is given. This giveness implies an order. The pre-Socratics, who found the notion of order, found it in material things. Plato, on the other hand, found it in eidos.

The world of forms does not and can not accommodate negative things, as they indicate a lack (non-being). For example, there cannot be an eidos of the ugliest thing (as it lacks beauty). Plato’s eidos or form has almost the same characteristics as Parmenides’ being. By nature, our soul focuses on becoming, and becoming changes. If, instead of being, the soul focuses on becoming, the soul does not know, it only opines, and its opinions will be fickle. One will only be able to have knowledge when one focuses on the eidos or the being, which is unchanging.

‘Good’ makes all other eidos visible or intelligible to us. All objects have eidos because they can be characterized. But this eidos is given as the order of the world is predetermined. For example, if perceptible objects, like chairs, have certain characteristics, like chairness, these characteristics are already available to me. The moment one perceives through eidos, they categorize, like the category of chair. There is an affinity between good (which is the principle arche for Plato) and eidos, because eidos is the basis for order. Eidos of orderliness is called good. When we know eidos we categorize the world. This ability to categorize is called intelligibility. One has to accept the givenness of eidos, or its a-priori nature. Though ‘good’ is how we acquire eidos, it is itself an eidos too.

Light analogy — Lack of light leads to unclear vision and lesser intelligibility. Similarly, lack of ‘good’ leads to lack of intelligibility. Conversely, more good leads to clearer knowledge.

The Platonic idea of love is that love for eidos is greater than love for something in the world of objects. The difference is between loving beautiful things versus loving the being of beauty itself.

‘Love’ is the force that makes one move to order. In the Symposium, it is the intermediate or the link of movement between the visible (like loving beautiful things) and the intelligible (like loving beauty itself). It is love as a lack which moves us towards definition. It pushes one to generate a state of stability.

On the Nature of Self

In an epistemological interpretation of The Republic, Plato attempts to show the nature of the epistemic self, which is chaotic and needs to be ordered, just like the state. Thus, he explicated the notion of an ordered state to explain the nature of an ordered self. Plato has already established a fundamental principle, that it is in order that each one does what is inherent in their nature. Certain people are meant to do certain things. People can only possess expertise for something if it is already in their nature. All individuals who make up a state must have an eidos to make them intelligible.

Plato divided the state into three distinct categories or natures:

1. Guardians (order)
2. Warrior (protect)
3. Service providers (provide)

This is how the polis should be structured. The state must be ‘good’ or ordered/just. But one has to be careful before charging Plato as a classicist. This division is based on birth (as nature or essence is given) and not family. The caste system, on the other hand, is based on ancestry, and sees ancestry and occupation as one. In Plato, this division is based on one’s nature. If it is ordered, then it is just. Good does not have any moral connotations here.

Order or Good

The pre-Socratic idea of logos is there in both Plato and Aristotle:

1. In Plato, it is ‘good’
2. In Aristotle, it is ‘eudaimonia’ or wellbeing

For the pre-Socratics, there is a given order which is arkhe. For Plato, ‘good’ is the principle of order (like dike/justice). Eidos allows us to order or categorize things. To have access to eidos is to understand the nature of the arche itself, as one has knowledge. Good is the highest essence that makes the other essences what they are. And even though all essences are independent, their utility comes about from a sense of order, which is brought about by ousia or good. Thus, Plato’s arche is dominated by ousia, which is good. Eidos enables order. ‘Good’ in its first invocation only means order. (In aesthetics, it means ‘symmetry’, which is also order.) ‘Good’ means being one with one’s nature. Note that there was no concept of existentialism, so this ‘good’ was only given and not created. Becoming is aimed towards being or good. In Book 6 of Republic, Plato says — From many good things, we have to move towards the being of the good.

Tripartite Division

Regarding the soul or the epistemic knower, there is a focus on two things:

1. Epistemic: how epistemic knowledge came to be
2. Metaphysical: the nature of epistemic knowledge

As the soul is equated with the state, it also has the same three parts. One individual can’t have 2 contradictory aspects at one time. This means if there are 2 contradictory things happening simultaneously, they must exist in 2 different things. Thus the soul has parts. For example, one can take ‘a’ to be the will to eat salad and ‘b’ the desire to eat pork. Thus, they have different natures, even though they co-exist in the same person.

X — — — — a, t (X is performing function ‘a’ at time ‘t’)

SOUL Y — — — — b, t (‘b’ is another function at time ‘t’)

Z — — — — c, t (‘a’ and ‘b’ contradict each other)

Tripartite division of the soul:

1. Reason — rational — account of ‘good’ — goodness — force of reason
2. Spirited — thumos — provides assent or dissent — willing
3. Appetitive — desire — generates the experience of lack — grounded in body — desiring

Passion provides force. The appetite must have specific objects. The spirit has passions that commit one to act. Will, for Plato, means the ability to assent or dissent. A lack has produced a disability which is desire. Desire does not entail action. An account is required, as per which one assents or dissents from action. One’s account is inconsequential to eidos, as one’s account can be wrong, but the ‘given’ eidos cannot.

Passions, when unhooked from reason, are dangerous, as they lack orderliness. Thus, if one wants ‘goodness’ or order, reason must be activated. The rational aspect of the brain is the only one that can order the soul. Without reason, one would just give in to desires and become an animal. The force of reason is ‘goodness’. In goodness, there is no desire or lack. Since goodness is the highest eidos, it is what we are moving towards. Irrationality only means that it is not a part of reason, so it must be a part of the body.

Based on the tripartite division, the three virtues are:

1. Moderation (appetitive)
2. Courage (Spirited)
3. Wisdom (Rational)

All three of these lead to the fourth cardinal virtue which is justice. When all aspects of one’s soul are in order, the soul functions according to its nature. Our souls are naturally ordered, but it is on the embodiment of our souls that the problem arises.

Why ‘good’ is important

Why is the ‘given’ good not the default? It is because of humans and our tripartite soul division. Aspects of the soul get imbalanced when the soul is embodied. The soul loses sight of its own ‘nature’. In such a deformed state, it is governed mostly by the spirited and the appetitive parts. We are not by default good/ordered/in a state of justice. Order has to be established. But how is it to be established?

The cosmos always has a principle of order. How does one exist in harmony with the cosmos? By trying to replicate the order of the cosmos, as the microcosm should reflect the macrocosm. For Plato, that order is ‘good’. To be ordered means to be with one’s nature. One’s nature is always given. One’s task is to discover the order or nature and act according to it.

When one is seeking knowledge, one is active. One is not passively waiting to be told what knowledge is. This is how the concept of the epistemic knower or the soul was developed. Ousia enables us to understand existence and explain why it is how it is (as arkhe). Once there is access to ousia, existence can be understood. In his posterior analysis, Plato talks about why arkhe is important, and why only being or ousia can qualify as arkhe and not any material elements. Because eidos is arche, arche is good. Note that good here means ordered, and does not have any moral connotations.

The exuberance of the joy of realizing ousia or good is so great that on having it, one feels the need to share it, as that would be similar to sharing the idea of emancipation or enlightenment. The person takes it to be their task and then becomes a martyr (like Socrates and Jesus) because of the reluctance of the others to accept the truth of ousia.

We can be ordered only by good

We are potentially rational human beings. Reason is an eidos equated with good. Until and unless one accepts the rational element, one cannot be good. Only the rational element can genuinely order the soul. For people like Plato and Parmenides, existence or experience is completely governed by reason.

In Plato’s philosophy, desires are not rejected. They are also necessary. They just need to be moderated by reason. So we are ‘potentially rational animals’. Reason should be in the driver’s seat. It should govern the appetitive will and the spirited desire. When reason takes a backseat, the appetitive part rules the spirited part, and there is unorderliness.

When he said “Know thyself”, Socrates meant that one’s nature must be in accordance with one’s reason. One should govern their appetites with moderation through reason. It is believed that the saying was initially said by Thales. He meant to convey that one should stay in one’s limits. This change of meaning is what is meant when one says that philosophy took an ‘ethical’ turn with Socrates.

Requirements for knowledge

The quest for knowledge is a cluster of eidos, knower and specific qualities in the knower. Each is a necessary condition. Collectively, they are sufficient.

There is a difference between necessary and sufficient cause. Necessary condition is a negative condition. Failing this condition, the effect will not be generated. But even if this condition is present, it does not guarantee that an effect will occur. On the other hand, sufficient conditions are positive. This means that it is enough to generate an effect.

Why we can order

Order can only occur if one has access to eidos. But how does one access eidos? The principle of good and eidos establishes and sustains order. But what makes us move towards good?

The Sun Analogy — The sun is analogous to good as it not only provides the principle of order but also sustains order. It is a source of both power and sustenance.

The passion that makes us move towards order is love (love for knowledge). This is given by Plato in his Symposium. This love is that which is between ignorance and knowledge. Thus it is the spirted part that relates the two. The aim or function of love is to move towards the intelligible, which is good or orderly. The visible realm is thus necessary for a movement to the higher realm of intelligible.

Analogy of the divided land

Division of objects on the basis of visibility and intelligibility

Objects are of two types:

1. Intelligible, which belong to the reason/rational part of the soul
2. Visible, which belong to the appetitive part of the soul

Both of these are related or connected by the spirited part of the soul, which provides mediation through passions. The relationship of communion or koinonia between discrete entities suggests that Plato had an ontological commitment.

Explanation of analogy

Source: https://quizlet.com/268801378/flashcards

The reason for the unequal division of line is that Plato wished to express the unequal portion of reality each of these supposed objects of reality claim. This separation is important because it marks a line between being and becoming. The becoming is regulated by being and is moving towards being. The last three realms can never be being as that would imply the possibility of becoming, which is not possible. For Plato the changing realm is granted sensibility because of eidos. Note that Plato does not reject the last three realms. He accepts them. He believes they are unreal (not to be conflated with non-existent) as they are not episteme, but they are not false as they are dependent on and determined by episteme.

Intelligible realm

This realm contains:

1. Dionia — Thought (Hypothesis and conclusion with dependency of object)
2. Noesis — Understanding (First Principle, Episteme and Eidos)

The highest realm of existence, noesis (which contains episteme), is not related to the senses at all. Dionia is somewhat related to the senses.

Estin or Essences as Forms or Eidos

Plato puts forward the theory of estin as forms. The realm of eidos is constituted by essences or toti estin. They are considered as being the highest forms. An essence does not demand anything other than itself to be what it is. It is kathaute or self-dependent or autonomous. Like Parmenides’ being, it is what it is by virtue of itself. But unlike Parmenides, Plato accepts the lower three realms also. Parmenides accepts only the highest realm in which being is there. Anything else for him is doxa or false.

In Book 7 of Republic, Plato introduces the allegory of the cave. When they are living inside the cave, they are only aware of shadows and nothing else. It is when they go out that they have access to dionia. When they move further away, they grasp ousia or the primary being. Plato believes that the joy that we get from sense objects is fake. We need to move away from them, away from acquaintances, and towards the realm of intelligible. Immanuel Kant’s transcendental aesthetics/dialectics seems to be inspired from Plato’s world of forms or world of intelligible.

Sensible realm — Pistis and Icasia

This realm contains:

1. Pistis — Perception (all material objects which are there)
2. Icasia — Shadows or reflections of material objects

Pistis and icasia are known by the senses. To make sense of these, eidos is needed. The material world participates in the world of eidos.

Knowledge does not exist in all four realms

To have knowledge is to be able to define. Access of eidos makes possible access to definition. Eidos only exists in the realm of episteme. In the visible realm of pistis and icasia, there is observation, which is perception but not knowledge. Today, formal sciences think of knowledge in terms of all four realms, like in math, grammar and logic. But these for Plato are thought (dionia) and not knowledge (episteme). He draws a distinction between knowledge as dionia and knowledge as episteme.

The intelligible realm of dionia is not knowledge as knowledge requires understanding, which dionia does not provide. All axioms are hypotheses or thoughts. They do not take one to eidos. They are postulates gained through induction. Knowing hypotheses is different from knowing eidos. Only the intelligible realm of noesis contains knowledge or episteme, as understanding, a prerequisite for knowledge, requires access to eidos. This understanding is grasped by the rational soul that advises the will which is governed by the appetites. For Plato, knowledge means the definition of knowledge and its eidos, and is only related with episteme. Math is dionia for Plato. What we call formula is for him hypothesis. A formula is general as opposed to a particular observation. The formal element (in the form of the formula) is not given in the senses. There is an element that does not hinder but enlightens in its presence. For example, I could speak a language without knowing its grammar. Thus, knowing a hypothesis is different from knowing eidos. It is for the acquisition of genuine knowledge that he is pushing us towards the realm of the intelligible. It is only in this realm that Parmenides moved.

When one asks you for a definition, one is asking you to move from the realm of senses to the realm of the intelligible. You are already operating with a definition, but the question is that is your definition a true definition? You will only know when you know the eidos. Socrates was hanged because he pointed out that people did not know this eidos. The problem is that we don’t know the eidos but we still think that we do. Only the one who has access to eidos can tell whether an account is good or bad.

To sum up:

1. Noesis — ‘Being’ is episteme acquired
2. Dionia — Hypothesis is once removed from episteme
3. Pistis — Object is twice removed from episteme
4. Icasia — Image is furthest removed from episteme

Socratic dialogue

Plato believed that it is by looking at a particular that one is able to postulate a hypothesis. Hypotheses have an abstract element of intelligible. One moves from visible to hypothesis to episteme. This movement from one hypothesis to another is the Socratic method or Socratic dialectic. The dialectic method is therefore the art of asking the right questions. Hypothesis uses bottom objects to reach conclusions or the first principle, which is noesis, but it does not reach it as it is mediated by objects. To elucidate, I have seen many triangles and then moved towards the idea of triangularity, but I am still dependent on objects for this idea. Things like music and math teach us how to make hypotheses.

Plato’s first principle is eidos or good. The existence of all objects is dependent on eidos. The trajectory of the Socratic dialogues going from the visible to hypothesis to episteme. For every genuine aspect of knowledge, Plato is pushing us towards eidos. The highest knowledge of eidos, episteme, is completely abstract. Hypothesis without understanding is possible. This is where the pre-Socratics stopped. But Plato took the pre-Socratic effort further. They were restricted to dionia or thought as their hypotheses lacked eidos. Plato believed that Parmenides was the only person to reach eidos. This move of knowledge is signified by a shift from change to being and from authority to account.

Dependence or relation

Plato makes a distinction between real and existent. He believes that Parmenides conflates existence with real. We must distinguish between reality and all that exists. All four realm exist, but not all of them are real. Everything exists, but of the things that exist, they can be divided into two, the real and the unreal (appearances). Every realm of existence has a (higher or lower) place in Plato’s epistemology. Plato accommodated everything and showed how they are related to each other. Parmenides accepted only the realm of being and called the other realm (of becoming or material things) false. Though he accepted that the last three realms do not have being, Plato, instead of discarding them, drew a relation of dependency.

Plato’s estin is translated as form. Eidos or eide is the name for the class of essences. This realm (noesis) has an autonomous existence (kath hauta — by virtue of itself). It has being and hence is stable, and does not demand anything else for its existence. All other realms are dependent on essences as they do not have being. They are not stable or complete. They are in motion as they are becoming. This is why Plato says that they are all appearances. The realm of appearance and the realm of being provide an alternative way of understanding the divided land. The realm of appearance is made sense of by thought (dionia), which is known through episteme (noesis).

To see something is to see something as, which, to Plato means that the thing is determinate. Remember that for Plato, being is given. There are as many essences as there are objects, therefore there are multiple essences. These essences are governed by good. Eidos are independent. They exist on their own accord, though they are governed by good.

Ousia is granted only to estin for both Plato and Aristotle. But Plato’s formulation of estin as eidos is rejected by Aristotle.

Acceptance of multiplicity

The quest for understanding existence began with the pre-Socratic search for arkhe. It was reduced by Parmenides to a singular being (with multiplicity being false). Plato retained Parmenides’ being in ousia or good but at the same time, he does not discard multiplicity. For Plato, primary being or ousia is one but there are other essences which are kathouta or self-sufficient. Plato accused Parmenides of only looking at ousia and not estin. For Parmenides, ousia is being. But for Plato, there are entities or essences (estin) other than the primary being (ousia) which are self-sufficient essences regulated by ousia.

Difference between doxa and episteme

We make judgments everyday without having knowledge about the truth of our account. Having the truth of the account is the same as having access to eidos. But most of the time, we do not have access to eidos. For example, I wish for there to be equality, but I cannot define equality. Plato talks about episteme and doxa to explain this point. Plato’s doxa is different from Parmenides’ doxa as the former can be true, one just does not know if it is, but the latter is taken to be false. So, doxa for Plato is when one does not know the definition of a thing but still passes judgements about it. This is what was common in all of Socrates’ ‘victims’. Note that doxa is not necessarily false. It can be true, but that is not known.

True judgment with understanding

Knowledge, according to Plato, is true judgment with understanding or account. The true objects of knowledge are essences (tote estin) constituted by ousia (good). Within Platonic thought, knowledge is completely definitional. One who has knowledge is one who has definitions. That is the person who has sofia or wisdom, which is absent when there is doxa.

At the end of Theaetetus, the definition that knowledge is true judgment (something one assents or dissents with) with understanding is undisputed. But this is an incomplete account of knowledge as we do not yet have an object of knowledge. This object takes the form of ideas or essences or eidos and is explicated in Republic.

With the inception of the concept of episteme arose the need to provide justification for a thing that is qualified as knowledge. This point was emphasized by Plato’s Socrates and Plato. There is a difference between knowledge and episteme. In the former, one does not have access to eidos, in the latter, one does. Knowledge is necessarily definitional. Being and knowledge are the same in that they are both true and certain.

Plato’s socio-political model is dependent entirely on truth

Plato’s socio-political order is based on truth. He assumes that everyone is concerned with truth or order. What he did not conceive of is that people are concerned only with their own interests, and not the truth.

Philosopher King

One does not know if one’s understanding is correct or not. Who verifies? The philosopher king.

In Book 7, Plato says that only a philosopher can be a genuine ruler because only philosophers know what an eidos is, and only they can replicate the order of the cosmos/eidos.

The only person who should lead or govern or rule, the Philosopher King, is one who has access to eidos. Wise has access to eidos. Only one who knows the eidos (which are necessarily good) can apply them to the world. Therefore, the wise should rule.

The political thought of Plato has to be authoritarian because not all people operate with wisdom. Thus democracy has the risk and possibility of failure. To prevent failure, it is required that only those who are wise be selected, but there is no certainty that the majority will make the right choice in that. Thus, as per Plato, democracy was not the best practice. People’s interests differ. They are not always geared towards what is right. Because existence is wisdom-based for Plato, it has to be autocratic.

Aristotle’s Interpretation of Plato

One question that philosophers have while interpreting the Republic is — In Plato’s realms and divided land analogy, is he making only an epistemic commitment, or an ontological commitment too?

One interpretation of Plato’s philosophy is that he is making only epistemological and not ontological commitments, as it is only possible to distinguish (and not separate) self from the other things based on the self. There is often a conflation between distinguishable and separable. We create things with language that do not have existence so if we look for an ontological commitment we might land into trouble. The continental thinkers like Frege opine that he is making only an epistemic commitment. This is a new understanding of Plato.

But the Western thinkers think that based on his choice of terms, he is making an ontological commitment. This is the traditional understanding based on Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato. Aristotle intercepts the Platonic system as having an ontological commitment (in addition to epistemological commitment). Eidos is separate or choriston from the world of appearance. There is a distinction between para and choriston. The former has no ontological commitment while the latter does. This gives grounds to Aristotle to present Plato as having an ontological commitment also, which he does in his Metaphysics. He accepts most of the epistemic framework proposed by Plato, but his major discomfort lies in his metaphysical orientation. Aristotle’s discomfort with Plato lies in his notion of arkhe. For Plato, ousia or good, which is the highest form of being or eidos, is the arkhe.

Aristotle says that Plato’s eidos is stable, but it is not the only thing that is. Plato did not realize that matter (hule) is also stable. Aristotle agrees with Plato that episteme begins with estin or definition. But Plato’s equation of estin with eidos makes him see them as being separate from the world of appearance/particulars.

Aristotle proposes an explanation for why Plato holds the position he does. Why did Plato have to come up with the idea of eidos itself? Because of necessity? Because of the question of the truth of things? Heraclitus put forward his doctrine of flux, as per which the material world is always changing, so it can never be determined. A thing is determinate when one can predicate characteristics to it, when it has an identity, or when it can be labeled as this/that/is. Plato accepts Heraclitus because to deny change would be to deny becoming. Unlike Parmenides, Plato does not do that. He accepts change and becoming. Note that this is just his projection of Heraclitus. But now the problem is to accommodate being or eidos. This is why Plato gives the divided land analogy.

Aristotle puts forward a response on Plato’s behalf. Knowledge demands a Platonic definition. Plato seeks to explain the nature of our linguistic determinacy. The world of appearances is in communion with the world of eidos. But, the usage of the word communion implies that the two are separate. So what does this communion mean? How is becoming in communion with being? Even though there are differences between Platonic eidos and Aristotelian morphe, there are similarities too. Both are required for a definition, and the journey of knowledge begins with a definition. They accounted for the existence of being and change in different ways. Their epistemic structure is similar but their ontological structure is very different.