The Feminist Critique of Philosophy
A discussion of the three approaches to feminist and philosophical theories as per Moira Gatens’ work ‘Feminism and Philosophy’
Introduction
Australian feminist philosopher, Moira Gatens, in her book Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality (p.1990), aims to rectify a weakness within feminist theory that restricts its scope to socio-political discussions. She points to the prevalent misconception within feminist theory that epistemology/metaphysics/theories of human nature are gender neutral.
In the chapter ‘The Feminist Critique of Philosophy’, Gatens discusses a critical/deconstructive approach to philosophy, which differs from other approaches as it is more focused on analyzing the binary opposition and category division in the history of philosophy, rather than focusing solely on understanding women’s position through existing theories which are male biased. Her way of criticizing philosophy exposes how, as a cultural activity, philosophy tends to give precedence to some categories of thought over others, and how these categories are connected to the contemporary understanding of sexual/feminist theories.
Responses of feminists to philosophy
Gatens describes, in some detail, two commonly held positions of feminists towards philosophy. The first approach is in favor of a complete rejection of philosophy, whereas the second one attempts to integrate into philosophy and extend its values to women. After exposing the flaws in both of these approaches, she proposes a third approach — the feminist critique of philosophy.
Approach 1: A woman-centered philosophy
This approach is a form of radical feminism/theoretical separatism. It consists of two major arguments:
Denial of relation between feminism and philosophy
As per this view, philosophy is a male enterprise which has, as its cause of origin, the inadequacies of the male sex. Philosophy is, therefore, not concerned with women. She quotes the view of Solanas to elucidate this:
“…the ultimate male insight is that life is absurd, so he invented philosophy…most men, utterly cowardly, project their inherent weaknesses onto women…so they label the male condition the Human Condition, pose their nothingness problem, which horrifies them, as a philosophical dilemma…”
Solanas claimed that women do not have any such ‘perverse’ relation to their being, as they are intuitive in their grasp of it. As there is an ‘inherent inadequacy’ in male sex, they came up with theory or philosophy.
Historically oppressive relation between philosophy and feminism
As per this position, there is a historically oppressive relationship between philosophy and feminism. Feminists who advocate this view argue for the rejection of patriarchal philosophy (and not for all of theory/philosophy) and for the development of a women-centered philosophy. She puts forward the thoughts of Daly and Spencer to elucidate this view. They believe that patriarchal scholars harbor malice and bias against women. They claim that the oppressive nature of the misogynistic culture is the reason for the alienation of women from their ‘true-being’. Gatens believes their claims to be ‘naïve’ and ‘empty fiction’. She puts forward a criticism raised by M. le Doeuff:
“The worst metaphysical positions are those which one adopts unconsciously whilst believing or claiming that one is speaking from a position outside philosophy.”
Daly assumes a ‘purity’ that is distinct from history, language or culture. Gatens interjects that women, just like men, are ‘products of culture’ and thus cannot assume an ‘a-priori purity or absence of contamination’ from culture and all that comes with it.
A similar criticism is raised by Gatens against Spender’s arguments. The latter was a proponent for the development of a ‘new, women-centered’ theory. Spenders said:
“We can choose to dispense with male views and values and we can generate and make explicit our own; and we can make our views and values authentic and real.”
Gatens points out a number of problems with this view. First, there is ambiguity about what would count as ‘authentic and real’. Second, there is an unfounded assumption that women’s values are inherently sound. Third, the view of pluralistic relativism comes with its own challenges.
The main flaw in all of these feminists’ arguments is their simultaneous inclusion and exclusion from culture (which they claim to be patriarchal). Gatens calls this ‘false/true dichotomization’ of women ‘untenable’. Additionally, this view fails to recognize that philosophy is an ongoing process and not a static entity. Gatens says:
“..one of the most worrying dangers of this approach is the unwitting affirmation, duplication or repetition of past philosophers’ descriptions of women. To affirm women’s nature as ‘naturally’ or ‘innately’ nurturing, sensitive or biophilic is to ignore the ways in which those qualities have been constructed by social, political and discursive practices.”
Approach 2: Feminism as completion of philosophy
As per this view, it is the attitudes of certain male philosophers that are to be blamed, and not the whole of philosophy. This view is associated mostly with liberal feminists. They believe that as a system of enquiry, philosophy is sex-neutral. Even though historically the field has been male-dominated, female scholars in the present have the opportunity to correct the biases within its social, political and economic theories. Further, Gatens says that once such bias is corrected and equality achieved, feminism would have served its purpose and be left redundant. She refers to Richard’s views here, as per who the purpose of feminism is to aid in the elimination of a certain kind of injustice. Once achieved, its need would no longer persist.
This approach is characterized by the adoption of a certain method of analysis for a particular philosophical theory, taking ‘women’ as the object. Scholarly feminist work, especially those published after Wollstonecraft, uses this approach. Gatens refers to Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, J.S Mill’s and Taylor’s liberalism, de Beauvoir’s existentialism in The Second Sex, and Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism.
Giving the example of Rousseau’s ‘poorly controlled sexual appetite’, Gatens remarks that these theories attempt to integrate women into theory at a level equal to that of men through the elimination of ‘surface level sexism’.
She also discusses the lack of reciprocity between male and female as reflected in philosophical accounts. Pointing out that the conception of ‘sexual equality’ is often understood as women ‘becoming-men’, she gives the reference of Rawl’s A Theory of Justice.
She points out certain flaws in this approach. She believes that Richard did not take into account the conflict prevalent in women’s involvement in public and private spheres as a cause of their political and ethical marginalization. She says:
“This invisibility (of women’s sexual justice) is directly related to the way the above-mentioned dichotomies operate in discussions of sexual differences. Women most often emerge from these analyses as less than human, as bound to their bodies and the exigencies of reproduction, as incapable of a certain kind of transcendence or reason that marks the truly human individual. Clearly, the dichotomies which dominate philosophical thinking are not sexually neutral but are deeply implicated in the politics of sexual difference.”
It is the realization of the above that leads to the development of a third, better approach to feminist and philosophical theories, claimed Gatens.
Approach 3: Critique of philosophy
This third way of approaching the relationship between feminist and philosophical theories aims at analyzing the historical construction of the female experience for the realization of the value of femininity. Thus, she advocates for a confrontation of the philosophical tradition.
Gatens notes that all the positive virtues, like good, light, unity and so on have been associated with maleness since the inception of Greek philosophy. On the other hand, negative values have been associated with females. She gives the examples of dichotomies like light/dark, good/bad, and unity/plurality (other than male/female). A more contemporary example is that of Descartes’ mind/body dichotomy.
Gatens does not necessarily promote a negative view of such dichotomies. Rather, she says it should be noted that these result in the creation of conceptual divisions in socio-political values as if they were factual/natural.
She refers to Nancy Jay’s work, Gender and Dichotomy, in which she highlights that dichotomies should not be understood as being a neutral way of dividing the world into categories. Instead, she emphasizes on the need for the realization that within every dichotomy exists a prominent term A at the expense of the term not-A. She also mentions Aristotle’s description of women as being ‘deformed-men’.
Gatens says:
“The important feature to note is that there is a history of women being defined only in terms relative to men, who are taken as the norm, the standard or the primary term.”
She mentions the works of Chodorow and Luce Irigaray that discuss deconstruction and phallocentrism (which can be defined as the privileging of the masculine (the phallus) in interpreting meaning/social relations).
She gives a more contemporary reference to Genevieve Lloyd’s The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy. She points to the difficulty of women’s access to resources like educational institutions and the imposition of confinement to domestic spheres that women did, and sometimes continue to face in the modern era. She blames the ‘discursive barriers between reason and femininity’ for such an exclusion. Her work emphasizes on two points — firstly, the conception of reason in opposition to femininity, and secondly, the classification of femininity as a discursive category stemming from such an exclusion.
Gatens points out that Rousseau (through his work Emile) was one of the philosophers who perpetrated the above mentioned exclusion. By assigning the role of wife/mother to women as their ‘natural’ role, he excluded them from the role of being a citizen. Gatens remarks:
“(A wife) is not a citizen, she does not share the (theoretically) equitable relations of the free market; in fact she is not a political animal at all. She has been defined only in terms relative to men and male needs.”
Gatens questions — why is it that even though philosophers like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have admitted that women and men are equals in the state of nature, that they continued to claim that women are naturally inferior to men when it comes to their cultural significance? For answering this question, an analysis of the social contract is required. As per this theory, women are assumed (conceptually) to still be in a ‘state of nature’. This is portrayed as the reason behind their lack of political existence. Gatens remarks:
“Woman is constructed as close to nature, subject to passion and disorder, and so excluded from the rational body politic, which then constructs her as its internal enemy, or as Hegel phrases it, as its ‘everlasting irony’…when a political theory is treated as sex-neutral, women will figure, in those theories, as deficient”
Takeaway and Conclusion
The third approach (the feminist critique of philosophy) supported by Gatens advocates for the inversion of the traditional conception of human nature/culture relation. By supporting neither the rejection of philosophy or feminism, it supports the transformation of both. Gatens points out the drawbacks in the first approach (as advocated by Daly and Spencer) on the account of the impossibility of an ‘unadulterated feminist theory’, and she dismisses the second approach (as supported by Richards) on account for its unrealistic expectation of philosophy as becoming truly neutral as to discard the need for feminism. Pointing out the conflict between the traditional conception of femininity, and the lived reality of females today, she advocates for the use of the third approach which involves the use of psychoanalytic theory and deconstruction to transcend dichotomous distinctions that hamper progress in feminist theory.
