Frege’s Anti-Psychologist and Anti-Idealist Views on Thought and Truth

An overview of Frege’s influential philosophical work “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”

Introduction to Frege

Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was a German philosopher, logician and mathematician. He is regarded by many as the father of analytic philosophy. He made notable contributions to the fields of philosophy of language, logic and mathematics. He worked as a professor at the University of Jena. He is also regarded as the greatest logician since Aristotle.

Overview of Frege’s Philosophical Contributions

Frege’s work was not given a lot of importance during his life(1848–1925), but was brought to attention later by influential philosophers like Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951).

His philosophical papers — ‘On Sense and Reference’ and ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’ have been very influential. In the former, Frege explores the two different types of meaning and Descriptivism, while in the latter, he presents arguments against Psychologism and Formalism.

Frege’s mission was to explain mathematical laws through logic. He wrote about the cognitive phenomenon of believing something to be true. A central claim that he makes is that when we take something to be ‘true’, we enter into a relationship with the abstract entity of ‘thought’. Thought, for Frege, can be understood as a particular kind of meaning expressed through sentences, which is either true or false. In the process of explaining what thought means in his work The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, he also explores the task of defining the term ‘true’, laying down basic properties of ‘thought’, and its ontological status.

Frege’s Mission of Philosophical Analysis

Frege’s mission of philosophical analysis is in line with what the British philosopher, Michael Dummett thought analytic philosophy should be based on.

“An analysis of thought can and must be given by an analysis of language.” — Michael Dummett

Frege employed the following three types of analysis to break down and understand concepts logically:

1. Decomposition Analysis, which involves breaking down complex concepts into simpler ones
2. Regressive Analysis, which uses simpler truth that have been acquired over time to reach to conclusion in the form of definition
3. Synthetic Analysis, which starts with a set of definitions to reach conclusion (it is the opposite of regressive analysis)

What Frege wanted was to create a mathematical language of philosophy that mirrors the world. There is consensus for the opinion that he failed in doing so. This blog is a detailed analysis of his Logicism.

On Truth

Frege begins the essay by making clear what he means by the use of ‘truth’ in his work. He explains the various accepted meanings/uses of it before revealing that for him, in The Thought, truth is used as a word that stands for the goal of the sciences.

Then he goes on to explore the notion that truth is a property. One by one, he ascribes it to pictures, ideas, sentences and thoughts. Pictures and ideas cannot be ascribed the property of truth, Frege demonstrating how such a predication (of truth) requires a correspondence theory of truth, and such a correspondence cannot be achieved because there will always be some difference between a picture/idea and thing in the external world.

Convergent argument against correspondence theory

1. Since it requires that there be a relation between two things, they go against the typical usage of the word ‘true’
2. If two items are found to be identical (and hence correspond perfectly), there would be no use of the person trying to assert anything
3. One might question the truth of the definition to which the correspondence is sought. A grasp of this question reveals that none capture the essence of truth, as otherwise, the question would have been deemed incoherent.

Frege attempts to define ‘truth’ through the correspondence theory but fails. As per him, if correspondence is not perfect or is only half-true, then it is logically false.

Frege points out that an idea can only be compared to a thing if the thing were an idea too, thus proving logically that things are not and can not be ideas. Because this is the case, perfect correspondence cannot be achieved, and this process does not lead to the attainment of truth.

Calling this attempt of finding truth through correspondence an infinite regress, he concedes that truth is indefinable (till then and per his capacity), and calls it to be a property of the sense of sentences. Truth cannot correspond with anything else, as that would lead to a regress situation.

Hence, Frege concludes that truth cannot be defined.

Truth and types of sentences

On sentences: Frege defines sentences as the material manifestations of thoughts. He described different types of sentences as having different senses. He goes on to describe the three parts of a sentence:

1. Content/thought/sense, which is neutral
2. Assertion, which is either true or false
3. Feelings, to which the concept of thought is not extended

Frege explains how it is the sense (content) of the sentence (and not the sentence itself) to which the property of truth is ascribed. To this, he adds that thought is the specific type of sense to which the value of truth/falsity can be sensibly assigned. Additionally, such an attribution (the ‘is true’ predicate) does not add anything to the content of the sentence. (For example, the two sentences — it is raining and it is true that it is raining have the same content).

Frege distinguishes between different types of sentences to emphasize that only those that make a statement can be ascribed the property of truth.

1. Imperative sentences, which are based on sense data only, and hence are not considered for thoughts
2. Exclamatory sentences, which are used to convey emotions and hence are not considered for thoughts
3. Performative sentences, which include commands and requests, are also not considered for thoughts
4. Interrogative/Indicative sentences, which are of two types — word questions (whose content is what/why/how and are not thoughts) and sentence questions (which are yes/no questions and thus are thoughts, since they are assertive/indicative sentences consisting of facts)

Composition of Word

Frege claimed that a ‘word’ is made up of the following two components:

1. Sense, which has cognitive significance as it refers to how one sees something. For example — the morning or the evening star. To this, Frege adds that thought is the sense of the word, and is mind-independent.
2. Reference/Referend, which is the denotation or object. For example — Venus

It should be noted that referends can also be imaginary words like ‘unicorn’ because these too can be associated with an object.

On Thoughts

The Three Categories

As per Frege, the following three things exist in the world:

1. Ideas, which are psychological feelings like pain and pleasure
2. Things, which are extra-mental entities or objects in the world and are both independent and mind-dependent
3. Thoughts, which are propositions that are mind-independent, purely objective in nature, and exist in a third realm

Defining Thought

As per Frege, a thought is something for which the question of truth arises.

To make the nature of thoughts clearer, he describes some of its basic properties. Thoughts are imperceptible, as our senses never interact with them. (We do not sense that the sun is rising, the truth value of this thought is grasped through a different means altogether)

Thoughts need not be asserted. As thoughts can also be expressed by non-assertory propositional questions, along with assertory interrogative sentences, it is indicated that the assertion and the truth of a thought are two different things. What he meant to say is that there is an existence which is independent use of thoughts and their truth values. Something true can be said without it being asserted.

Thoughts are eternal and unchanging. There is Platonism about them in this sense.

Frege also emphasizes the importance of seriousness at this point. In the presence of sarcasm, this result (assertion) will not be reached. Assertive force is a key ingredient. For example, ‘Batman flew to Gotham’ is false/meaningless, even though it is ‘true’ within the story.

Sentential content contributes to the under and over-determination of thoughts. For example, poetic or expressive words do not help in the expression of a thought.

Frege emphasizes on the ontological status of thoughts. As per him, thoughts are not external or sensible objects of the world. Truth is a property that attaches itself to thoughts and not to external or sensed objects, hence these cannot be the same.

The three stages

Frege describes the following three stages of ascribing truth to a sentence

1. Thinking, or the apprehension of the thought
2. Judgment, or the recognition of truth/falsity of a thought
3. Assertion, or the manifestation of a judgment

Thought as the sense of a sentence

Frege believed that immaterial thought could be understood through the sense of a sentence. He explained how thought is an abstract entity since it cannot be derived directly from sense data.

Frege states that a sentence (which is based on sense impressions) can lead us to a question of truth because the truth/falsity of a sentence is based on its sense impressions. This leads us to affirm the existence of immaterial thought.

Since truth is not a quality derived from sense-data, nothing new is added to a thought by ascribing to it the property of truth. Thoughts are intrinsically neutral

As already established by Frege, ascribing the property of truth does not add anything to a sentence. Instead, it is the assertion that adds the property of truth/falsity to a thought.

Content of the sentence

With the help of examples, Frege shows how it is often the case that the contents of a sentence go beyond the thought. This occurs especially in the case of emotional context. (For example, in a sentence, words like horse/mare can be interchanged without the meaning being affected)

In contrast to the above, he also points out how, at times, wording alone is inadequate for expressing a thought. (For example, ‘I’ can be used in different senses depending on the speaker).

Difference between Thought and Idea

Frege considers the claim that thoughts might be ideas. By ‘ideas’, he is referring to internal items of an individual’s mental life (sensations, desires, intentions, and the like).

He contends that thoughts cannot be ideas, because the latter have a fixed set of properties that the former do not. Ideas are possessed by persons (they are constituents of their consciousness). If thoughts were considered to be the same, then it would imply that their truth is relative to the individual, because consciousness is a subjective thing, and no two individuals can be said to share it. This cannot be the case, as thoughts are mutually grasped entities, and are in no way related/dependent on a person’s consciousness.

For ideas and thoughts to be identical, they need to have the same properties. By the above reasoning, Frege proved that this is not the case. They have divergent properties and hence are not the same.

He further illustrates this with an example. Multiple people can recognize the Pythagorean theorem to be true. It is not the content of any individual’s consciousness, nor does it need to have a bearer to be considered true. It is, thus, a thought, and not an idea.

At the same time, we can say that a thought is what can be/is the same about different ideas. They can be compared to Platonic forms in this respect, as two individuals always have different ideas, but can have the same thought.

A Third Realm: Frege said that thoughts are (obviously) not things of the outer world, but they are not things of the inner world either (else they would lose their objectivity as they (the thought) would belong to their ideas). This must mean that thoughts belong in a third realm.

Ideas are not things

1. Ideas cannot be seen, touched, smelt, tasted or heard
2. Ideas are had. They are the content of the consciousness of the individual who has them.
3. Ideas need a bearer. Unlike the things of the outer world, they are not independent.
4. Each idea has only one bearer. Two (or more) people cannot share an idea.

Frege rejected the Berkeleyan/Solipsist view and claimed that things are not ideas because they do exist outside our mind in the external world.

Expression of Anti-Psychologist and Anti-Idealist Views

The Thought was written by Frege as a response to Kantian and Hegelian theories of Idealism. His intention was to discover the laws of truth.

“Logic is concerned with truth, just as aesthetics with beauty and ethics with the good.” — Frege

He believed that because laws of truth exist, laws of thought must exist as well. This meant that the former is derived from the latter, with both of them sharing the same non-psychological nature.

The three central features of Frege’s analytic philosophy are as follows:

1. Anti-Psychologism (as he claimed that thought is mind-independent)
2. Anti-Idealism (as he was opposed to Kantian and Hegelian Idealism)
3. A-Historicism (as he dismissed Aristotelian logic and created his own)

Therefore, as per Frege, logic has nothing to do with psychological laws. Psychological laws are never broken (since they are natural laws that deal with how our brain functions). On the other hand, laws of logic, just like laws of ethics, are often broken. Laws here merely refer to how one should think, not to how one actually does think.

Drawing a line between psychology and logic: Frege emphasized the importance of not blurring the line between logic and psychology, as only the former can be used to discover the laws of truth. He emphasized that his mission was to discover the laws of truth only, and not the laws of thought. Further, he elucidates what the word ‘true’ does and does not mean in the context he intends to use it. For him, true is used to refer to ‘the goal of science’.

Critique of Hume and Berkeley: He criticizes Hume and Berkeley for mixing up thought and ideas and for discussing the former in a psychological sense, and goes on to draw a distinction between the two.

Two Arguments Against Idealism

Frege attacks the skeptical claim that ideas are all that we can know to exist. In support of this, he gives two arguments:

1. As per the first argument, there is a need for a minimum of one external object for us to explain our experiences. As per Frege, selves (conscious entities possessing ideas) cannot, themselves, be explained in terms of ideas. This is because he claims that it is much more reasonable to present the self as an independent object than explain it in terms of particular contents of consciousness.
2. The second argument stems from pragmatism. If we were to accept the claim that ideas are all that exist, then we would be giving up on all substantive inquiry for which an assumption that external objects exist is implied. Since this would be an unacceptable outcome, Frege urges that skepticism be rejected.

Conclusion

Three types of things exist in the world — ideas, which are psychological processes like feelings, thoughts, which are Boolean propositions, and things, which are extramental objects like trees. We have ideas, we apprehend thoughts and we perceive things.

Frege disagreed with the philosophical stand of idealism and suggested that it be replaced with logic (or philosophy of language) instead. For accomplishing this, he introduced the quantification theory, which made up predicate calculus (a logical system in which the predicate is the dominant part of the propositions).

Thoughts exist neither as external objects nor as ideas. They are bearers of truth and exist independently. This follows from Frege’s rejection of skepticism (as mentioned above). Hence, it follows that thoughts must exist in a third realm which is beyond time and space, yet is within our grasp.

From his enquiry into the nature of thoughts, Frege concludes that they have an indirect causal impact on the world. Also, by better understanding what it means to assign the truth value to something (a thought), we come closer to the comprehension of the nature of thinking.