On Sense and Reference By Gottlob Frege
An overview and summary of the takeaway from this influential work in philosophy of language
Introduction
The imperfections in natural language bothered Frege. He pointed out that it is because of these that a lot of confusions in understanding arise. He believed that it was the variety of usage of language (in the form of poetry, metaphor, analogy etc.) apart from its use for disseminating information that causes confusions when it comes to understanding what words and sentences in language mean.
Proposing his solution, Frege believed that each sign must be assigned a fixed definition so that everyone has the exact same understanding of it. This would lead to the creation of a universal language that would aid in the progress of scientific work.
Frege acknowledged the magnanimity of this task and proposed his work — “Begriffsschrift” (German for concept-script) as the first attempt at the commencement of such an ideal language.
Overview of the Cognitive Puzzle
According to Frege’s theory of sense and reference, there is a cognitive puzzle that arises when we try to understand how words and expressions can have different meanings even when they refer to the same object or thing in the world.
This puzzle is based on identity statements (statements that claims that an object is identical to itself) and the Law of Identity (as per which statements of the form a=a and a=b should be exactly the same). But we can see through the following example that a=a and a=b (even though both are true) have cognitive differences.
For example, the expressions “the morning star” and “the evening star” both refer to the planet Venus, but they have different senses or meanings. The cognitive puzzle arises when we try to understand how two expressions with different senses can refer to the same object.
The puzzle is — how do we account for these cognitive differences? This puzzle challenges our traditional understanding of meaning and reference, and Frege’s theory of sense and reference provides a framework for resolving it. By distinguishing between sense and reference, Frege helps us to understand how words and expressions can have different meanings even when they refer to the same object, and he provides a way of explaining how meaning is conveyed through language.
The Problem
Frege begins by asking the question mentioned below (which points to the cognitive puzzle) :
Is ‘identity’ a relation between objects or between names/signs of an object?
This can be understood with the help of the following:
[‘a’ refers to Morning Star; ‘b’ refers to Evening Star]
If a=b, then
i) a=b
and also
ii) a=a
As per i), a and b are equal. This implies that they are replaceable (by each other). But at the same time, both of them have different cognitive values. This shows the distinction between the epistemological status of the two propositions.
Incase of i), an informative statement that is not known a-priori is made. An astronomical finding (that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are both referring to Venus) is expressed.
Whereas incase of ii), an a-priori, analytic truth is expressed. (The statement that the Morning Star is the same as the Morning Star does not tell us anything new).
We cannot replace i) with ii) as they both have different cognitive/epistemological values.
Solution to the Problem
Frege proposed that the above mentioned puzzle can be resolved by understanding the difference between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’.
Distinction Between Sense And Reference
It should be noted that both i) and ii) are true; they just differ in their cognitive significance. Morning Star and Evening Star both have the same reference, namely Venus, but they have different senses (they are both named after the time of their appearance in the sky). To understand the sense expressed by a name, one must be familiar with the language involved.
A sense is a mode of presentation of a reference.
A reference can be presented in a number of ways depending on the mode of presentation used. [Venus — a reference, can be presented in two different senses — the Morning Star and the Evening Star]
The reference of a name is usually a particular object. [It is not necessary here for the object to be a material, perceivable object, it can be an event, a number or a place, among other things]
For example: Capitalism refers to a system in which profit-oriented private enterprise dictates the economic and political state of a country.
Note: A name denotes its reference and conveys its sense.
Sense Differs From Individual Ideas
Frege described ideas as changing with people or with time. Sense, on the other hand, does not. Sense can be understood as a shared understanding that is transmitted over generations.
Sense-Reference Distinction Applies To Other Forms Of Language
After he clarifies the difference between sense and reference, Frege goes on to apply this distinction to other forms that language takes.
Sentences With Proper Names But No Reference
There are sentences that have a sense but no reference. The meaning of the sentence is the same as its thought or sense.
For example: A centaur is half-human and half-horse.
But ‘centaurs’ are non-existent entities and do not have references. That being said, the sentence itself is capable of being understood if the language it is being expressed in is understood.
This shows that it is not enough for a sentence to possess a thought or a sense. The truth value of a sentence is determined by the reference of the proper name contained in that sentence. To elucidate through another example — “The Queen of India is wise.” has a sense, but no reference (since there is no Queen of India). Hence, this sense is devoid of any truth value.
Subordinate Sentence As Clauses
Here, Frege addresses sentences that have complex structures because they contain different kinds of subordinate clauses. These subordinate clauses, which are a component of the sentence, are of various types. What Frege emphasizes on is the point that the sense of the clause is NOT the sense of the sentence, but only a part.
Noun Clauses: When the noun clause is made up of an indirect quotation, it stands for only an indirect reference. Such noun subordinate clauses consist of thoughts but do not possess truth values. These clauses begins with words like ‘that’, ‘conclude’, ‘be of the opinion’ etc. Substituting words in the clause with other words is not allowed.
For example: Harry is of the opinion that Yoda has great fencing skills.
Adverbial Clauses: These clauses have a sense but no reference. They usually start with the expression of a reason, command, request or a question, among other things. Even though these are not thoughts, they are placed at a similar level. Therefore, the question of truth value does not arise for these clauses.
For example: Because my current job does not satisfy me, I am looking for a new one.
Clauses Without Complete Thought: These clauses (and the sentences they are in) do not have any truth value. They do not express a complete thought. They start with words like ‘whoever’ and ‘whatever’ and have no independent sense or reference.
For example: Whoever has a pet dog knows what a huge responsibility it is.
Conditional Clauses: These clauses are not standalone/independent but require a conjunction of such clauses to create a sentence and a thought. If they happen to contain a proper name, then its truth value is dependent of its parts.
For example: If you enjoyed reading this blog, you should check out the others too.
Conclusion
Even though it was not possible for Frege to consider every possible instance in a natural language, he succeeded in pointing out why subordinate clauses can not be replaced by another without affecting the truth value of the entire sentence.
Imperfections of the natural language can be blamed for any confusion that has arisen. With the use of a logically correct language, as described in the Begriffsschrift, such confusions can be avoided as the language used would consist of grammatically apt expressions. These expressions would have signs that are proper names with which everyone who understands the language is familiar as designating fixed objects. He lays emphasis on not producing new signs that are proper names devoid of references.
The takeaway is this — as a=a and a=b have different cognitive values, when it comes to the intent of knowledge, a sentence’s sense is of as much importance as its reference (truth value). The sense of an expression is the way in which it is used in language and the meaning it conveys, while the reference is the object or thing to which it refers.
Frege’s theory of sense and reference is a crucial contribution to the philosophy of language, as it provides a framework for understanding how language relates to the world. By making a distinction between sense and reference, Frege helped us to understand how meaning is conveyed through language and how we can use language to refer to objects and things in the world. His theory remains relevant today and has been influential in shaping modern philosophy.
